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APOPHATIC COMMUNITY:
YANNARAS ON RELATIONAL BEING
FRED DALLMAYR

ABSTRACT: For Martin Heidegger the story of Western philosophy ended basically in
egocentrism or the metaphysics of “subjectivity”; however, he acknowledged the possibility
of another path in Greece: that of pre-Socratic thinking. Yet, there is a further path he did
not acknowledge: the tradition of Orthodox philosophy and theology. The paper focuses on
some key works of the prominent contemporary Greek philosopher Christos Yannaras, for a
long time professor in Athens. Taking over the notions of “Being” and ontology, Yannaras
construes them (with Heidegger) not as ontic “substances” amenable to epistemic
knowledge, but as guideposts to “relational” or participatory experience. His early text On
the Absence and Unknowability of God: Heidegger and the Aeropagite explores the (at least
partial) affinity between the German thinker and the Orthodox stress on “apophaticism.”
For Yannaras, apophaticism profoundly reorients philosophical inquiry; it also has
important implications for human “personhood” and “freedom.” Far from denoting
individuation, personhood for him means a face (prosopon) standing out toward others, just
as freedom transcends self-will in the direction of a relational event. By way of conclusion, I
probe the status of relational “community.” For Yannaras, I ask, is community a concretely
achieved way of life (exemplified by the Orthodox Church); or does it point more
apophatically (and prophetically) to a future advent?
Keywords: apophaticism, freedom, modernity, morality, personhood relationality

Martin Heidegger’s affection (even predilection) for Greek thought is well known.
The dominant theme of his work—the “question of Being”—was ultimately derived
from Aristotle, though with an important twist: the transformation of the Greek
concept into an existential issue and challenge. To a large extent, it was the
conceptual rationalism of classical Greek philosophy which subsequently led
Heidegger steadily in the direction of Pre-Socratic thinkers, especially Parmenides,
Anaximander, and Heraclitus. In his view, the legacy of the Pre-Socratics was
sidelined or forgotten in the history of Western philosophy which, partly under the
influence of Plato and Aristotle, developed steadily into the kind of rational-epistemic
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“metaphysics” which he considered a derailment of thought. Yet, irrespective of
thebeneficial or detrimental influence of the Greek tradition, Heidegger throughout
his life remained fond of “Griechenland” seen as a homeland of sustained reflection
and imagination. As he wrote in a letter of 1957: “Greece remains still the dream
which sustains every new initiative of thinking.” In 1962, after considerable
hesitation and trepidation, Heidegger visited the dream land finally. As he asked in
his log-book of the trip: “Can Greece still speak to us in its own language and address
us as its hearers—us, people of an age penetrated everywhere by the power and
artificiality of technology?”1
As Heidegger was surely aware, Greece—if at all able to address us—is bound to
speak in different idioms and voices. As it seems, he was not aware of a very
contemporary voice which, curiously, manages to reconnect present-day reflection
with the world of Heraclitus and the Pre-Socratics: the voice of Greek “orthodox”
theology and philosophy. In the present pages, I want to lift up for attention the work
of one of the most prominent contemporary Greek thinkers: Christos Yannaras,
Professor Emeritus in philosophy at the Pantion University in Athens. Born in 1935,
Yannaras studied for some time in Germany—where he encountered the thought of
Heidegger—before he turned to additional philosophical and theological studies in
Paris and Greece. What attracted Yannaras to Heidegger was chiefly the critique of
Western “metaphysics” with its central focuses on rational epistemology and its
disdain for experiential knowledge. In a recessed manner, Heidegger’s influence is
also present in the rejection of Descartes’s ego cogito and the embrace of a radical
“relationism” on the level of both personal encounters and general ontology. What
Yannaras opposes to Western metaphysics is “apophaticism” or an “apophatic faith”
which he himself defined as “a stance against knowledge and epistemology,” a
“denial of ‘conceptual idols’ and of the psychological props of egocentric selfassurance.”2 Given the great number of his publications I shall focus in the following
on a limited number of studies: first, a text dealing explicitly with Heidegger and
apophaticism; next, studies devoted to (anti-individualistic) “personalism” and human
freedom; finally I shall offer some comments or afterthoughts on “apophatic
community.”
1. HEIDEGGER AND THE AREOPAGITE
As mentioned, Yannaras as a young man studied a few years in Germany where he
acquainted himself with Heidegger’s writings. The details and scope of his
acquaintance are not known (to me). But it is clear that his familiarity extended
beyond Being and Time and included some of Heidegger’s work after the “Kehre,”
especially his writings on Nietzsche and “European nihilism.” The latter familiarity is
evident in one of his earliest texts, published in 1967, titled (in translation) On the
1
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Absence and Unknowability of God: Heidegger and the Areopagite. The book opens
instantly with a reference to Nietzsche’s proclamation of the “death of God” in The
Gay Science, put in the mouth of a “madman.” For Yannaras, Nietzsche’s word does
not mean the affirmation or celebration of a straightforward atheism—as it appeared
to the madman’s hearers in the marketplace. Rather, it denotes the absence or
vanishing of a certain “metaphysical” conception of God where the divine is the
object of epistemic knowledge. In this sense, he endorses basically Heidegger’s
interpretation of the proclamation as expounded in his Nietzsche texts in the early
1940’s. As he writes: “‘God is dead’ means that the Christian God, the God of
Western metaphysics, is but a dead fashioning of the mind, hardly more than a
rational idea, an abstract concept. At best, ‘God’ stands for an idolized, conventional
‘value’.” Since the tenability of this epistemic concept has been shown to be illusory,
the place of God in Western thought is now “empty,” a marker for divine “absence.”
Above all, the metaphysical concept is unrelated to human experience and the
shaping of Western or European culture. This is what is meant (and what Heidegger
meant) by “European nihilism.”3
The vanishing of God or the divine from Western thought was not a sudden
cataclysmic event; rather, it was the result of a long trajectory moving through several
centuries. In Yannaras’ portrayal, the denial or absentism of God “took shape
gradually in the West from the fourteenth century onwards, culminating finally in
Nietzsche’s prophetic proclamation.” An important stepping stone was the late
medieval, early modern misconstrual of the Greek (both Heraklitian and Aristotelian)
notion of reason or “logos,” a term that originally still implied a “reference and
relation,” the means of establishing knowledge “through experienced relationship or
the common potentiality of relationship.” The departure from this notion of a
relational gathering was dramatic. “The Scholastics and Descartes,” Yannaras
comments briskly,” introduced into human history the interpretation of [Greek] logos
as [Roman] ratio, and ratio as a self-reliant, subjective capacity, the capacity of
individual calculation and reckoning which is competent to define the truth
exhaustively.” It was from this capacity of calculation that Descartes deduced the
concept of a perfect or divine being, a being that ultimately “has the same kind of
certainty as a geometrical truth.” In line with this deductive process, Yannaras notes,
God was either identified with “the concept of an impersonal and abstract ‘first cause’
(causa prima)” or else as “the absolute authority in ethics (principium autoritatis).”
In both cases, God is the figment of the cogito, but unrelated to existential human
experience. But seen as a figment or fiction, the concept ultimately was bound to
collapse. Thus, “precisely because it offered an absolutized rational affirmation of
God. European metaphysics prepared the ground of its own rational refutation.”4
Regarding Western efforts to obtain epistemic “knowledge” of the divine,
Yannaras reviews the sequence of attempted “proofs” of God—ranging from the
Scholastic conception of God as ‘first cause,” to Anselm’s “ontological argument,” to
3
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the teleological principle of a necessary “end”—finding all of them flawed as
exercises of purely mental acrobatics. The weakness of these exercises was already
exposed by the Protestant Reformation when Martin Luther presented God as
“inaccessible to reason” and basically “hidden” (Deus absconditus). Although to
some extent accepting Luther’s verdict, the Enlightenment and critical rationalism
preserved the gist of Scholastic efforts by turning God from a substance or essence
into a rational postulate or critical ideal. This transformation was accomplished
especially by Kant’s critical philosophy. In Yannaras’ words: “Kant counters the
dogmatic conceptual rationalism of Scholastic metaphysics with the critical power of
pure reason”—a power which constitutes God as “the ethical demand of the will of
the human subject.” In this manner, Kant makes the case for “the moral origin of
religion, that is, for the understanding of moral principles as divine commands on the
basis of a philosophical anthropology.” In modified form, this approach was
continued by German idealism which brought to fulfillment the formation of a
“moralistic anthropological a-theism.” This anthropological turn was particularly
evident in the work of Fichte who saw the human subject as “the central starting point
or axis of any philosophy.” While sometimes quarreling with Fichte, other idealists
(including Hegel) agreed on the necessary anchoring of knowledge in the
consciousness of subjectivity or the “monism of the subject.”5
Pondering the shipwreck of the epistemic knowledge of the divine, Yannaras
turns to the alternative: the “unknowability of God” announced in the book’s title,
that is, to the apophatic path or approach. As he emphasizes, this approach does not
merely involve a denial of knowledge or the simple acceptance of limits of reason in
the sense of a “negative theology” (theologia negativa). Such an acceptance was even
familiar to Scholasticism as a humble supplement to reason, but denial here was
unproductive of new or different insights. In Yannaras words: While diverging from
traditional theology, apophaticism appeared first in the West “to demarcate the limits,
that is to say, the relativity of cataphatic [positive] affirmation”; however, by merely
stressing the limits of reason, this kind inevitably facilitated “the rise of relativism,
skepticism, and even agnosticism.” Thus, the “via negativia” of the Scholastics
ignored or failed to grasp an alternative approach to knowledge and understanding:
one that “characterized the entire Greek tradition, both Christian and pre-Christian,”
namely, knowledge or insight as “the experienced immediacy of relatedness, of the
identity of truthfulness and participation.” Yannaras at this point introduces the
distinction between an “apophaticism of essence” exemplified by Western
Scholasticism, and an “apophaticism of the person” characteristic of Christian
thought in the Greek East. While the former merely rallied against an epistemic
concept, the latter involves a personal experience and discovery: “I start from the
discovery that my existence and the knowledge that I have are facts of accomplished
relationships—and relationship is not exhausted by conceptual analysis….Thus, if
5
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God exists he is primarily known as a ‘person’ (hypostasis) in the immediacy of a
relationship and not primarily as an ‘essence’ with its conceptual definition.”6
This second type of apophaticism, in Yannaras’ view, was a distinctive work of
Greek thought from the beginning, reaching back to Heraclitus and the Pre-Socratics;
it was even present in classical Greek philosophy (which was “distorted” by the
Scholastics); but it reached its fullest expression in “orthodox” Christian thought as
represented by Gregory Palamas and Dionysios the Areopagite (and his school). In
the latter case, the notion of the “unknowability” and “absence” of God implies that
God is a non-being or “nothingness”—not in the sense of a simple vacuum but as an
inexhaustible source and potentiality. In the words of the Areopagite: “Indeed, the
inscrutable One is out of reach of every rational process…. Mind beyond mind, word
beyond speech, it is gathered up by no discourse, by no intuition, by no name. It is
and it is as no other being is. Source of all beings, it alone could give an authoritative
account of what really is.” As this teaching was later summarized by Maximos the
Confessor: “God is said to be both being and non-being, since he is none of the things
that are, but transcends unknowably everything that is; for there is ‘nothing’ that is
known in light of the fact that God is ‘nothing’.” As Yannaras elaborates: “According
to the Areopagitical writings, no existential category, not even the ‘most spiritual’
among the properties of human nature or being can be ascribed to God as determining
his essence.” Seen in this light, Greek theological apophaticism constitutes “a
transcendence of any epistemic methodology—both of the analogical way of
affirmation and negation and of the way of causality.”7 Yannaras at this point returns
to Heidegger, saying: “The ‘nihilism’ of Heidegger—as a refusal to subject God and
Being to conceptual constructs—seems provisionally to fit in with what we have
called, relying on the Areopagitical writings, apophatic abandonment.” He also cites
one of Heidegger’s statements: “Atheistic thought that denies the God of philosophy,
the God as causa sui, is perhaps closer to the divine God (ist dem göttlichen Gott
vielleicht näher).”8
To be sure, Yannaras does not wish to overstate the affinity between Heidegger
and the Areopagitical corpus. Apart from the distance of time and culture, there are
two features which seem to him to be missing in Heidegger’s perspective: the notion
of an ontological relation of “persons,” and the linkage of apophaticism to human
“freedom” and “otherness.” As he writes: In the Greek perspective, “there is
preserved not only the many-sidedness of the subject’s faculty of apprehension, but
also the otherness of each subjective approach to knowledge as well as the freedom of
approach, the exclusion of any predetermination. In other words, the catholicity of
knowing through relationship preserves the chief elements—otherness and
freedom—with which we mark out the personal existence of humankind.”9 I do not
6
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wish to make too much of this distinction—which seems to be based at least in part
on misunderstanding. Thus, the notion of “difference”—as used in Identity and
Difference—signifies for Heidegger both a radical distance or “otherness” and
simultaneously a mutual belonging or gathering. In turn the concept of
“personhood”—borrowed in large part from Max Scheler—is largely preserved in the
idea of existential finitude and “singularity” and in the “ekstatic” openness of Dasein
to Being. The same openness to Being in its ontological “transcendence” also
establishes human “freedom” seen as rupture of empirical determinism. Regarding
finally “relationship,” no theme is more pervasive in Heidegger’s work—provided the
term does not designate the artificial joining together of isolated elements.
In the concluding chapters of the discussed text, Yannaras elaborates more fully
on the linkage of apophaticism with personhood and personal participation, on the
one hand, and with loving “communion,” on the other. Distinguishing again between
epistemic “essence” and experiential “existence,” he writes: “The mode of existence
that we know only ‘by participation’ we call personal. God acts in a personal manner,
that is, as a person or rather a community, a trinity of persons.” The notion of
“person” or “personal” here is closely connected with experiential participation, of
the caring inherence of one in the other. This aspect applies also to the experience of
the divine: “Hence, we characterize God’s mode of existence as personal, primarily
because it corresponds to the experience we have of human personal existence: an
existence with self-consciousness, with thoughtful relatedness, with ‘ekstatic’
otherness and the freedom from any predetermination.” As one should add: the aspect
of participation and experimental relatedness is always marked also by a dimension of
“absence and unknowability” which exceeds positive articulation. Hence, experiential
participation may be symbolically conveyed, but can “never be exhausted” in positive
(cataphatic) formulation.
The same kind of absence or hiddenness is also found in loving or “erotic”
relationship where the target of love can never be fully known or possessed—thus
always involving an element of “passion” or suffering. The Greek Areopagitical
tradition speaks of “eros” as a “yearning” for and “suffering the divine things.” In
Yannaras’ words: apophatic is in this sense “an ‘erotic’ naming of God, the
attribution to God of names, symbols and designations as these emerge from the
human erotic relationship with him.” Stressing the trans-epistemic quality of
apophasis, the same tradition also speaks of the “experience of God as the ‘mad
lover’ of the whole creation and of each human person.” What this depiction refers to,
Yannaras concludes, is “to the precisely ecstatic existence of God, to the erotic will of
the Godhead, unapproachable and imparticipable in his essence, to be offered as an
active call to personal relationship.”10
10
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2. PERSON, LOVE, AND FREEDOM
As mentioned, Yannaras is a prolific scholar, the author of numerous books and other
texts. Despite the vast expanse of his writings, however, there is a remarkable
continuity and coherence in his outlook; despite ongoing revisions or modifications,
there are a number of key themes in his work—some of which had been briefly
announced in the study of 1967. How central these themes are to Yannaras’ thinking
became obvious a few years later, in 1970, when two major works were almost
simultaneously published, titled (in translation) Person and Eros and The Freedom of
Morality. According to an observer, the publication of the books caused quite a stir,
even “an explosion” in intellectual life and established the author as a leading
philosopher-cum-theologian in Greece. The first book turned the limelight instantly
on the meaning of “person” or “personhood” defining it not as a self-centered identity
but as an open or “ekstatic” relationship. Turning to the Greek term for person,
“prosópon,” Yannaras wrote: “The proposition pros (toward) together with the noun
ops (which means ‘eye,’ ‘face,’ ‘countenance’) forms the composite word pros-ópon.
I have my face turned toward someone or something, thus indicating a reference or
relation.” As Andrew Louth (professor of Patristics) elaborates: “A crucial step in the
exposition is the analysis of the nature of the ‘personal’ and the distinction between
the ‘person’ and the ‘individual’…. For whereas an individual is defined in terms of
his self-identity and distinction from other individuals, as a kind of irreducible unit or
monad, person is defined in terms of relationships: an openness to and
acknowledgement of the ‘other’.”11
Yannaras is quite aware of the difficult status of “person” or “personhood” in
Western philosophy, especially of its frequent comingling with “consciousness” and
“subjectivity.” He agrees with Edmund Husserl and much of early phenomenology
that consciousness “appears first of all as a necessary and sufficient condition of the
phenomenality of phenomena,” the fact that phenomena presuppose “the fact of their
disclosure” (to consciousness). As Husserl had argued, consciousness is always a
“consciousness of something,” meaning that consciousness is “intentionally” directed
toward a content. For Yannaras, however, this conception still showed a primacy of
the subject and awareness as an individual faculty, thus stopping short of grasping
“relationality” itself. As he writes (in a Heideggerian vein), “the capacity for
consciousness alone is not sufficient to explain the principle of the relation of beings
to the person; the former belongs too referential character of the person, but does not
explain it.” Thus, there is a primacy of “relation” over subjective consciousness, and
this primacy is anchored in the “ecstatic” or self-transgressing character of
“personhood.” For Yannaras, the person is distinguished from an abstract “ego
cogito” not only by virtue of its relationality, but also by virtue of its distinctive
“personal” quality (what is sometimes called “singularity”). Thus, although a general
or universal human feature, personhood is also marked by diversity or difference. As
the text emphasizes (again partly following Heidegger): “The starting point of the
11
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ontological question (the question about Being and beings, their relation and their
difference) is not the human power of cognitive reason but the much more basic
reality of the person itself.”12
The notion of person or personhood, as articulated by Yannaras, is sharply
differentiated from the classical conception of the “rational animal,” a being defined
by epistemic reason (zoon logon echon). This conception, he acknowledges, was
“strongly challenged by Heidegger” who demonstrated that it was “far removed from
the core of the ontological problem” and ultimately transferred it to the realm of
“value judgments,” thus making it the starting point of an “axiological metaphysics.”
In Yannaras’ account, this metaphysics was developed first of all by the Scholastics
and later by modern Western rationalism, but was partially overthrown by Immanuel
Kant who anchored metaphysics in the critical power of human rationality which, in
turn, was anchored in individual “subjectivity.” This Kantian approach was modified
and refined by German idealist thought—but not basically contested. Thus, it
happened that modern Western thought—for Yannaras—was increasingly
characterized “by humanity’s imprisonment in subjectivity” and, at the same time,
“by the effort to obtain absolute ‘objectivity’ (through science),” centered in both
cases in the individual cogito. At this point, the text invokes again (what it calls) a
“great moment” in modern philosophy: namely, the “new ontology of Martin
Heidegger,” his attempt to formulate “a non-metaphysical ontology,” to transcend,
via phenomenology, “the absolute and ‘ontic’ definition of Being, as well as the
subjectivity and rationalism of modern metaphyics.” Basically, what Heidegger did
was to recast the ontological question as “the difference between beings and Being,”
where the former are disclosed as phenomena, while Being itself “loves to hide,” thus
hovering between absence and presence. It is the aspect of disclosure and the
interplay of absence and presence which renders epistemic certainty in the traditional
sense impossible.13
An important aspect of Yannaras’ notion of personhood is its distinction from a
self-enclosed or atomistic individuality, and this via its open-ended relationality. As
he writes: “The person, as absolute otherness, is differentiated from anything
conceived by the intellect as definable (ontic) being. This is why every person’s
mode of existence is objectively “indeterminable, unique, dissimilar and
unrepeatable.” In different words, that which makes a person distinctive—“to idiazon,
his or her otherness”—cannot be epistemically defined but can only be concretely
experienced, that is, “as a unique, dissimilar and unrepeatable relation.” As one
should note, relation here is not understood as the mere joining of pre-existing (ontic)
individualities because relation, as a concrete engagement, precedes the possibility of
separate existences. The person, Yannaras emphasizes, is “that mode of existence
which is actualized as relation, not merely disclosed as relation. It is only as dynamic
reference, only as ‘opposite-something’, only as unique, dissimilar and unrepeatable
relation.” Underscoring and further sharpening this point, the text states: “It is
12
13
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evident…that here we are very far from any kind of objectified subjectivism, any kind
of axiologically determined priority of the subject as the capacity for consciousness
and intellectuality.” Proceeding to give to this conception a quasi-ontologically
grounding, Yannaras adds: “Whatever is becomes apparent only with reference to a
person, is disclosed only within the terms of the relation which reveals the otherness
of the person. In other words, person and beings are the term of a relation, and this
relation poses [or encapsulates] the ontological question.14
As one can see, the traditional ontological question—“what is Being” (and the
Being of beings)—is translated here into a question of relationality, and more
specifically a relationality of “persons.” What is by passed (or at least pushed
somewhat into the background) is the question of the relation of Being and non-being
and of presence and absence; as a corollary, the so-called “ontic-ontological
difference” resurfaces basically as a difference of modes of personhood. It is on the
basis of this shift of accent that Yannaras returns to Heidegger’s thought, in an effort
to reconnect that thought with the Greek religious tradition. A key term in this
reconnection is the notion of “ekstasis” or ecstatic openness. In a Heideggerian vein,
Yannaras describes his approach as a “transition from the ontic-individual perception
of human existence to its ecstatic determination.” As he elaborates, however, ekstasis
here is not defined as “humanity’s ability to ‘stand outside’ its natural identity, to
wonder at its being” (as it was defined by Heidegger). Rather ekstasis now means the
“actualization of the person’s otherness, that is, the existential presupposition itself of
the person.” Differently put, ekstasis signifies the transference from the naturally
given capacity for thinking to “the otherness of personal actualization.” At this point,
Yannaras builds a bridge from the self-transcendence of personal existence to the
deeper aspirations of Greek Orthodox faith. In his words: “The dynamic and always
unachieved consummation of personal relation is the eros of the Greek Church
Fathers, the loving impetus and movement of exodus from individualized existence
for the sake of the actualization of relation in the highest sense.” Eros here means
“the dynamics of ekstasy which finds consummation in personal reference to supreme
Otherness” (or God). The text here cites the words of Dionysius the Areopagite:
“Divine eros is also ekstatic, so that the lovers belong not to themselves but to the
beloved as target of love.”15
As one can see, the issue of “ekstatic” openness is transcribed into a theistic
register—although a radically apophatic register. Yannaras returns here to his
distinction between the “apophaticism of essence” and the “apophaticism of person,”
assigning the former basically to the Western tradition and the latter to Eastern or
Orthodox thought. Given his emphasis on the centrality of Being—although a Being
beyond epistemic definition—Heidegger seems to have placed himself somewhere at
the boundary of the two modes of apophaticism (a location also revealed by his
concern for non-being or nothingness). Without fully exploring this issue (or leaving

14
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it at the margin),16 Yannaras in the later part of his study discovers the fullness of
sublime relationality in the Christian trinity. In his words: “For the Fathers of the
Greek East, the fullness of dimensionless erotic unity is the loving interpenetration of
the Persons of the Holy Trinity: God is ‘the all of eros’.” The Persons of the Trinity
are not divided by essence, nor are they separated by power, or place (topos) or
energy, since (according to John Damascene) “their abiding in each other and their
interpenetration are inseparable.” These words are particularly important for the
topical placement of the Persons (where Scripture says that the Son “sits on the right
hand”). For Yannaras, one has to banish here all spatial delimitation: the place (topos)
of God is the “dimensionless personal loving relation, the eros of triadic
communion.” Differently put: love is the “place” of divine existence. As he adds, this
loving relationality percolates from the divine throughout creation and the entire
world. In the view of Maximos the Confessor, the whole of creation has to be seen as
“a unified dimensionless erotic fact, an erotic relation dynamically arranged in a
hierarchy and universal erotic movement which constitutes creation”—always “with
reference back to God.” In this universal and hierarchical relationality humanity plays
a special role as mediator and actualizing agent: “Humanity’s role as ‘mediator’
between God and the world is fulfilled in the dynamic recapitulation of the erotic
interdependence of creation. Humanity is the unique potentiality of personal
realization of cosmic eros.”17
As a mediator and actualizer of universal relationality, humanity also enjoys the
privilege of not being fully tied down to the nexus of cause and effect: the capacity
for freedom elevating human beings (potentially) out of the maelstrom of natural
necessity. This is the central theme of the companion volume published first in 1970
under the title (in translation) The Freedom of Morality. The book is a paean to
human personal freedom achieved (and only achievable) through participation in the
cosmic and divinely inspired relationality discussed before. In essence, the book is a
critique of and attack on dominant Western theories of morality (from Kant to JeanPaul Sartre): theories where morality is anchored in individual human autonomy and
self-determination or else on abstract moral principles or rules (likewise grounded in
autonomy). For Yannaras, all these conceptions are vitiated by their egocentrism and
their neglect of the “ekstatic” quality of personhood. As he writes, modern Western
conceptions tend to leave out of account “the ontological question of the truth and
reality of human existence, the question of what ‘man’ really is as distinct from what
he ought to be.” What is ignored is that morality is “first and foremost an existential
16

The text contains a longer section on “The Fall and Nothingness,” but it does not reach the level of
Heideggerian “nihilation.” This is evident in passages like the following: “Nothingness constitutes a
personal potentiality of existence because it is the denial of the mode of existence which the person
alone can attain (or refuse to attain). It is the opposite of Kenosis…. Sin is the moral content of
nothingness as an existential fact, the measure of the annihilation of existential fulfillment….
Nothingness hence may be defined in the end not as a concept but as a moral reality, a confirmation of
the existential truth of the person, the ability of a human being to say No to God—nullifying but not
annihilating the truth of his or her personal existence.” See Yannaras 2007, 273, 292-293.
17
Op. cit., 118-122.
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event: the dynamic realization of the fullness of human life and existence.” For
Yannaras, human being is principally a mode of “relationship and communion.” This
means that the human being is “a person and not an individual, a segment or
subdivision of nature as a whole.” A person represents not the relation of a part to the
whole, but the possibility of summing up the whole in a distinctiveness of
relationship, in an act of self-transcendence” (ekstasis). As one needs to note here,
self-transcendence is not an individual “project,” not an act of willful selfdetermination; rather, it is induced and supported by participation in a divinely
ordained cosmic event: Personhood is “the mode of existence shared by God and
man; the ethos of trinitarian life imprinted upon the human being.”18
An important point to be taken into account is that personal relationality is not an
automatic happening, a simple fact of “nature”; rather it involves an ethical
transformation or spiritual “Kehre.” Differently put: although relationality prevails as
an ever-present potentiality or possibility, its actualization requires cultivation, steady
care and “ekstatic” openness. As Yannaras writes: “From the moment when the
human person rejects the [spiritual] call and communion in which he himself is
grounded, from the moment when he seeks merely natural and existential autonomy,
he becomes alienated from himself.” The reason is that, left to its own devices,
human “nature” is fragmented and divided into “individual wills” expressing the
individual’s effort to survive in “natural self-sufficiency.” Viewed from a properly
ontological perspective, however, the “natural” need for individual survival runs
counter to “the personal freedom and distinctiveness which can be realized only
through love and communion.” Thus, human divisiveness and fragmentation are
actually a “falling away” from or an “alteration” of the personalist call for
relationship. To overcome this alteration requires an effort—guided from above—to
loosen the shackles of self-contained individuality and thus to gain genuine freedom:
Human beings must refuse to be “wrapped up in the individuality which sets the
individual as an ego against the individual existences of other people.” This kind of
liberation or emancipation is best achieved through spiritual engagement, and
especially through attention to the divine “word” which as removed the “gulf between
man and God.” In Yannaras’ word: “This regeneration of ‘man’ in Christ requires
only the cooperation of man’s freedom, his assent to Christ’s ‘frenzied love’ for him
as a person.” As he adds: “It thus becomes clear that the ‘morality’ of the Gospel is
the absolute antithesis of any kind of individual ethics, since it presupposes the
transformation of individuality into an existential reality of communion and
relationship.”19

18

Yannaras 1996, 14-15, 20-21, 23. As Yannaras observes sternly (114): “Any systematic pursuit of
‘improvement’ in man through his own individual will and effort, of taming his nature through his own
powers, is condemned by nature itself. Man on his own cannot cease to be what he ‘naturally’ is….
This is also why every anthropocentric, autonomous morality ends up as a fruitless insistence on an
utterly inadequate human self-sufficiency, an expression of man’s fall.”
19
Op. cit., 30-31, 37, 52-53.
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3. COMMUNITY PAST AND FUTURE
This stress on “communion” or “community” and the equation of relationship with
community prompts me to offer some afterthoughts or critical reflections. As
previously indicated, Yannaras has written a great number of books and articles, not
all of which can receive attention in a short essay. In lieu of roaming over his larger
opus, I consider it preferable to step back and venture a tentative (and surely
corrigible) assessment of some of his central thoughts. As it seems to me, a major
qualm provoked by his work is the resort to binary opposition, that is, the tendency to
slip into the black-and-white rhetoric of radical antithesis. An example is the contrast
between individual freedom and the “existential reality” of community or
communion. What surfaces behind this contrast is the collision between (Westernstyle) modernity and anti-modernity, where the former term stands for critical
reasoning (sapere aude) and the liberation of people from social bondage (including
the bondage of a coercive, purely traditional community). Yannaras’s texts are
vehement in their denunciation of this kind of modernity. As he writes in The Church
in Post-Communist Europe, modernity has brought about a way of life that is
“antithetical” to and even “diabolically” at odds with the “ecclesial” basis of orthodox
life in the East. The separation of Christian faith from society has enabled the growth
of a civilization that, in his words, is “barbaric.”20 Similarly we read in Postmodern
Metaphysics: “The modern age signifies a break in all its aspects. Doubtless the
matrix of the modern breaks with what was formerly permanent, self-evident and
authoritative….The break with established religious tradition and authority defines
the aims of the modern age.”21
This emphasis on a break caused by modernity is not confined to Yannaras (and
some other defenders of Greek orthodoxy). In different forms, one finds it in most
cultures that are victimized (or feel themselves victimized) by modern Western
culture and technology. Examples of such cultural backlash can be detected in
numerous cultural traditions: in Islam (in the form of Wahhabism and ISIS); in India
(in the ideology of Hindutva), and in many other countries (in the upsurge of
exclusionary nationalism or chauvinism). 22 In some of these cases, opposition is
virulent and even veers toward aggressive violence. To be sure, Yannaras’s work is
untarnished by aggressive extremism. Nevertheless, in the confrontation with the
modern or contemporary age, his texts often sound harshly dismissive, and certainly
do not betray that generous sympathy which, in his own view, should characterize
inter-human and inter-cultural relations. To this extent, I tend to agree with Daniel
Payne when he depicts Yannaras’s work as more nostalgic or backward-looking than
forward-looking, more attracted to traditional (now mostly defunct) modes for
community life than to contemporary or emerging possibilities. As an alternative to
20

See Yannaras, 2003, 21-30.
Yannaras, 2004, 1-2.
22
Hostility to Western-style modernity is not limited to foreign or non-Western countries. One can find
similar denunciations also in the West. One may recall here the “anti-modernist” doctrine in the
Catholic Church in the early part of the last century. Compare also Bloom 1987 and Deneen 2018.
21
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the present situation, he writes, “Yannaras seeks to retrieve the Byzantine
autonomous communities that developed toward the end of the Ottoman Empire. The
life of these communities was centered around the life of the church or monastery
found in its midst…. [Thus] the ecclesial life becomes the basis for human society….
[The community] he is looking for is none other than the Orthodox Church.”23
Partly for reasons of inter-cultural sympathy, I tend to shy away from radical
breaks or antitheses. Whenever possible I prefer to listen to arguments emphasizing
the “dialectic” of cultural developments, and thus also the “dialectic of
enlightenment” or the “dialectic of modernity.”24 What dialectic suggests is that, in
history, winnings and losses are closely entwined and that all winnings have losses
and via versa. Regarding the issue of modernity one can readily agree with Yannaras
about the immense detriments and devastations unleashed by the modern age, evident
in the rise of self-centeredness, technological mastery, and dehumanization.
However, there are also features which cannot simply be dismissed as losses. Among
these features I would count the processes of steadily advancing democratization and
also globalization. What these processes bring into now (at least potentially), are
novel kinds of “community” which can be embraced from a Christian as well as from
broadly spiritual and even secular perspectives. As is well known, modern democracy
is largely inspired by the revolutionary motto “liberty, equality, fraternity”—a motto
which can be reconciled with Christian aspirations, as Jacques Maritain and others
have shown. In the ambiance of the Orthodox tradition, a possible resonance between
democracy and Christian faith has also been explored by a number of contemporary
thinkers, such as Miroslav Volf. As the latter states, democracy opens up a space
where natives and “others” are integrated and where strangers and immigrants can be
embraced in the spirit of loving reconciliation and peace.25 This quality of openness is
further underscored by the process of globalization where people of different cultural
backgrounds are brought closer together, thus mitigating and contesting the harsh
legacies of racism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia.
At it seems to me, these new kinds of relationality or community are not (or
should not be) too far removed from Yannaras’s perspective, especially his accent on
the “apophatic” character of all beings and relationships, that is, their not-empiricallyclosed and thus inexhaustible quality. In a judicious and equitable manner, this aspect
is fully recognized by Daniel Payne. In his words: “Yannaras’s understanding of the
human ‘person’ makes possible the articulation of a manner of existence that
necessitates a level of pluralism and difference within [and beyond] society. This is so
because, in order to love the other, the other must be different from the self….
Because of the modern situation whereby persons participate in multiple identities, an
independent perichoretic participation in the life of the other is enabled by the
pluralistic nature of human society [and the world]. In this manner, the person
engages [or can engage] in a dialogical relationship with others.” This open
23

Payne 2011, 252-253.
The classical text in this domain is Horkheimer and Adorno 1972.
25
See Volf 1996.
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relationality extends also to the church, including the Orthodox Church, in the sense
that the church “can function in a pluralistic [democratic] society through dialogue
and perichoretic relation with other institutions.” Thus, Payne adds, “rather than
living a sectarian existence withdrawn from modern society, the church can
participate in the lives of modern citizens who seek spiritual answers to existential
dilemmas.”26 In this manner, the judgment of a backward-looking nostalgia for past
ways of life is tempered or corrected in favor of present-day relevance. At various
points, Yannaras himself has endorsed this correction or change of outlook. In 1986,
in a Festschrift for Jürgen Moltmann, Yannaras stated: “Apophaticism means the
refusal to exhaust knowledge of the truth in its formulation”—which also means “its
past or traditional formulation.” The title of the Festschrift was God’s Future—Future
of the World. Thus, in his contribution Yannaras clearly recognized the “futurism,”
that is, the promised advent of the “kingdom to come.”27
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